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Abstract. The model elimination calculus is a linear, refutationally complete calculus for 
first order clause logic. We show how to extend this calculus with aframeworkfor theory 
reasoning. Theory reasoning m~ans to separate the knowledge of a given domain or theory and 
treat it by special purpose inference rules. We present two versions of theory model elimination: 
the one is called total theory model elimination (which allows e.g. to treat equality in a rigid 
E-resolution style), and the other is called partial theory model elimination (which allows e.g. 
to treat equality in a paramodulation style). 
1 INlRODUCTION 
The model elimination calculus (ME calculus) has been developed already in the early days of 
automated theorem proving ([Lov78b]). It is a linear, refutationally complete calculus for first 
order clause logic. In this paper, we will show how to extend model elimination with theory 
reasoning. 
Technically, theory reasoning means to relieve a calculus from explicit reasoning in some 
domain (e.g. equality, partial orders) by taking apart the domain knowledge and treating it by 
special inference rules. In an implementation, this results in a universal "foreground" reasoner 
that calls a specialized "background" reasoner for theory reasoning. Theory reasoning comes 
in two variants ([Sti85]): total and panial theory reasoning. Total theory reasoning generalizes 
the idea of finding complementary literals in inferences (e.g. resolution) to a semantic level. 
For example, in theory resolution the foreground reasoner may select from some clauses the 
literal set {a < b, b < c, c < a}, pass it to the background reasoner (assume that< is interpreted 
as a strict ordering, i.e. as a transitive and irreflexive relation) which in turn should discover 
that this set is contradictory. Finally the theory resolvent is built as in ordinary resolution by 
collecting the rest literals. The problem with total theory reasoning is that in general it cannot 
be predicted what literals and how many variants of them constitute a contradictory set. As a 
solution, partial theory reasoning tries to break the "big" total steps into more managable smaller 
steps. In the example, the background reasoner might be passed {a < b, b < c}, compute the 
logical consequence a < c and return it as a new subgoal, called "residue", to the foreground 
reasoner. In the next step, the foreground reasoner might call the background reasoner with 
{a < c, c < a} again, which detects a trivial contradiction and thus concludes this chain. It is 
this panial theory reasoning we are mostly interested in. 
Theory reasoning is a very general scheme and thus has many applications, among them are 
reasoning with taxonomical knowledge as in the Krypton system ([BGL85]), equality reasoning 
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as by paramodulation orE-resolution, building in theory-unification, and building in the axioms 
of the "reachability" relation in the translation of modal logic to ordinary first order logic. 
The advantages of theory reasoning, when compared with the naive method of supplying 
the theories's axioms as clauses, are the following: for the first, the theory inference system may 
be specially tailored for the theory to be reasoned with; thus higher efficiency can be achieved 
by a clever reasoner that takes advantage of the theories' properties. For the second, a lot of 
computation that is not relevant for the overall proof plan is hidden in the background. Thus 
proofs become shorter and are more compact, leading to better readability. 
Of course, theory reasoning is not new. It was introduced by M. Stickel within the general, 
non-linear resolution calculus ([Sti85, Sti83]). Since then the scheme was ported to many calculi. 
It was done for matrix methods in [MR87], for the connection method in [Bib87, Pet90], and for 
the connection graph calculus in ([0hl86, Ohl87]). In ([Bau92a]) we showed that total theory 
reasoning is compatible to ordering restrictions. 
However there are significant differences between these works and the present one: for the 
first, model elimination is a linear calculus, which roughly means that an initially chosen goal 
clause is stepwisely processed until the refutation is found. Being a very efficient restriction, 
we want to keep it in our theory calculus. However none of the theory extensions of the above 
calculi makes . use of linear restrictions. As a consequence we also need a new completeness 
proof and cannot use e.g. Stickel 's proof. This new proof is our main result. 
Another difference is our emphasis on partial theory reasoning. The completeness of the 
overall calculus depends from the completeness of the background reasoner for partial theory 
reasoning. Except Stickel ([Sti85]), the above authors do not supply sufficient completeness 
preserving criteria for the background reasoner. Again, since Stickel 's calculus is nonlinear, his 
criteria cannot be applied in our case. Below we will define a reasonable criteria that meets 
our demands. This criteria also captures a treatment of equality by "linear paramodulation". 
Since linear paramodulation is complete ([FHS89]) we obtain as a corrollary the completeness 
of model elimination with paramodulation. 
We will differ from Loveland's original ME calculus in two aspects: for the first, we 
have omitted some efficiency improvements such as factoring, and also we do not disallow 
inference steps that yield identical literals in a chain. This happens because in this paper we 
want to concentrate on the basic mechanisms of theory reasoning. We will adopt the efficiency 
improvements later. For the second we made a change in data structures: instead of chains we 
follow ([LSBB92]) and work in a tree-like setting in the tradition of analytic tableaux. This 
happens because we are mostly interested to implement our results in the SETHEO theorem 
prover(see also ([LSBB92])), which is based on that tableaux. 
2 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MODEL ELIMINATION 
As mentioned above, we will follow the lines from [LSBB92] and define the inference rules as 
tree-transforming operators. Since we should not assume this format to be well-known, we will 
supply a brief and informal introduction. 
In our format, model elimination can be seen as a restriction of semantic tableaux with 
unification for clauses (see [Fit90]). This restriction will be explained below. A tableau 
is, roughly, a tree whose nodes are labelled with literals in such a way that brother nodes 
correspond to a clause in the given clause set. A refutation is the construction of a tableau 
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where every branch is contradictory. For this construction we have to start with an initial 
tableau consisting of a single clause, and then repeatedly apply the inference rules extension and 
reduction until every branch is checked to be contradictory. Consider the unsatisfiable clause 
set {A VB, -,A VC, ...,c V -.A, --,B}. and the following refutation: 
~ ~ ~ 
A B 
1. Initial tableau 
with A VB 
~AB A~ 
~;t c ~;t{A_} 











5. Extension with 
-.B 
In step 1, the tableau consisting of A VB is built. In step 2 the branch ending in A is extended 
with ..,A VC and marked with a* (such branches are called closed); in general, extension is only 
allowed if the leaf of the branch is complementary to a literal in the clause extended with. Step 
3 is an extension step with ...,c V ..,A, and the branch ending in -.C is closed. Step 4 depicts the 
reduction inference: a branch, in this case AC-.A, may be closed if the leaf is complementary 
to one of its ancestors. Finally, in step 5 the last open branch.is closed by extension with ..,B. 
Note that a closed branch contains complementary literals A and -.A and thus is unsatisfiable. 
If all branches are closed then the input clause set is unsatisfiable. 
As usual, the ground case is lifted to the general case by taking variants of clauses, and 
establishing complementarism by means of a most general unifier. It should be noted that this 
unifier has to be applied to the entire tableau. 
There is a close correspondance to linear resolution (see e.g. [CL73]): the set of open leafs 
corresponds to the near parent clause, extension corresponds to input resolution, and reduction 
corresponds to ancestor resolution. This correspondance also explains why model elimination 
is called "linear". If the restriction "the leaf (and not just any other literal in the branch) must 
be one of the complementary literals" is dropped, the calculus is no longer linear. 
Lovelands original chain-notation ([Lov78a]) with A- and B-literals can be seen as a linear 
notation for our tableaux. More precisely, the open branches can bijectively be mapped to a 
chain, where the leafs are B-literals and the inner nodes are A-literals. If in the tableau model 
elimination always the "rightmost" branch is selected for extension or reduction, then there 
exist corre~ponding inference steps in chain model elimination. See ([BF92]) for a detailled 
comparison. 
3 THEORY UNIFIERS 
A clause is a multiset of literals written as Lt V ... V L.,. A theory T is a satisfiable 
set of clauses.1 Concerning model theory it is sufficient to consider Herbrand-interpretations 
only, which assign a fixed meaning to all language elements short of atoms; thus we define a 
1This restriction is motivated by the intended application of a Herbrand-Theorem, which only holds for 
universally quantified theories 
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(Herb rand-) interpretation to be any total function from the set of ground atoms to {true, false}. 
A(Herbrand-) 7-interpretation is an interpretation satisfying the theory T. An interpretation 
(xesp. 7-interpretation) I satisfies (resp. T -satisfies) a clause set M iff I simultaneously 
assigns true to all ground instances of the clauses in M. (7)-(un-)satisfiability and (7-)validity 
of clause sets are defined on top of this notion as usual. 
As with non-theory calculi the refutations should be computed at a most general level; this 
is usually achieved by most general unifiers. In the presence of theories however, unifiers need 
not be unique, and they are replaced by a more general concept: 
Definition 3.1 Let S = { L1, ••• , Ln} be a literal set. S is called T -complementary iff the 
'v'-quantifieddisjunction V(L1 V ... V Ln) is 7-valid. By abuse oflanguage, we will say that a 
substitution (j is a 7 -unifier for S iff S u is T -complementary. A "partial" variant is as follows: 
a pair ( (j' R), where u is a substitution and R is a literal, is aT -residue of S iff Su U { R} is 
minimal 7-complementary. (End definition) 
There is a subtle difference between the T -complementary of a literal set and the T-
unsatisfiability of S when S is read as a set of unit clauses. These notions are the same only for 
ground sets. Consider, for example, a language with at least two constant symbols a and b and 
the "empty" theory 0. Then S = { P( x ), -,p(y)} is, when read as a clause set, 0-unsatisfiable, 
but S is not 0-complementary, because the clause P( x) V -,P(y) is not 0-valid (because the 
interpretation with I( P( a)) = false and I( P( b)) = true is no model). However, when applying 
the MGU (j = { x .._ y} to S the resulting set S u is 0-complementary. 
The importance of "complementary" arises from its application in inference rules, such 
as resolution, which have for soundness reasons be built on top of "complementarism", but 
not on "unsatisfiablitity". Since we deal with theory inference rules, we had to extend the 
usual notion of "complementarism" to "7-complementarism". As an example consider the 
theory£ of equality. Then S = {P(x),y = f(y),-,P(f(f(a)))} is £-unsatisfiable but not 
£-complementary. However with the £-unifier u = { x .._ a, y .._ a}, S u is £-complementary. 
In this context it might be interesting to known that our notion of theory unifier generalizes the 
notion of rigid E-unifier ([GNPS90]) to more general theories than equality (see ([Bau92a]) for 
a proof). 
The semantics of a residue ( L, u) of S is given as follows: L is a logical consequence of 
S(j; operationally Lis a new goal to be proved. For example letS' = { P( x ), y = f(y)}. Then 
( {x ~ y}, P(J(y))) is an £-residue of S', since S' {x .._ y} U { -,P(f(y))} = 
{P(y), y = f(y), -,p(f(y))} is minimal £-complementary. 
4 CALCULUS 
Theory reasoning calculi require the computation of theory unifiers. Of course, any implemen-
tation of theory-unification in the traditional sense (see [Sie89]), e.g. AC-unification, performs a 
stepwise computation. Since we are interested in partial theory reasoning (see the introduction), 
this computation shall not remain hidden for the foreground reasoner; instead, intermediate 
results shall be passed back from the background reasoner to the foreground reasoner in the 
form of residues. 
Let us informally describe this on the ground level with the aid of an example. Consider 
the clause setS = {a< b V d < e, b < c V -,a< b, c <a, e < d}. S is unsatisfiable in the 
5 
theory of strict orderings (<is transitive and irreflexive), and this is a theory model elimination 
proof: 
~ ~ ~ 
a<b d<e d<e a<b d<e 
~ 
b<c -.a<b b<c -.a<b 
I I 
a<c ( a<c 
c<a 
* 
1. Initial tableau 2. Partial extension with 3. Total extension with 








5. Total extension 
with e<d 
In step 1, the tableau consisting of a < b V b < c is built. In step 2 the branch ending in 
a < b is partially extended with the clause b · < c V -.a < b and the residue a < c (in this ground 
example no substitutions appear). The literals of the extending clauses which are relevant for 
the extension step, here solely b < c, are called extending literals. This step is sound, because 
a < c is a logical consequence of its ancestors a < b and b < c. The literals that semantically 
justify the inference step in this way are called the key set (here {a < b, b < c} ). Since the 
branch resulting from this step is not contradictory, it is not closed (marked with a star). Besides 
partial extension, there exi~ts another inference rule called total extension. Step 3. serves as an 
example: the extension with c < a yields a theory-contradiction with a < c. Thus the branch 
may be closed. The ancestor literals that justify the total inference step, i.e. the contradictory 
set { c < a, a < c} is also called a "key set", and c < a is also called "extending' literal". Step 
4. is an ordinary reduction step, and step 5 is a total extension step again. 
The inference steps are restricted in such a way that their key sets must consist a) of the leaf 
and b) possibly some other literals of the old branch, and c) of all extending literals. Condition 
c) implies that all new clauses are needed, and condition b) is the generalization of the condition 
"the leaf must be one of the complementary literals" in non-theory model elimination (section 
2) to theory model elimination. 
Let us now come to a formal treatment. We are concerned with ordered, labelled trees with 
finite branching factor and finite length. A branch b of length k is a sequence b = no o n 1 o · · · o nk 
of nodes, where no is the root, ni+l is a son of ni and nk is a leaf, and a tree is represented as a 
multiset of branches. A literal tree is a tree whose nodes are labelled with literals, except the root, 
which remains unlabelled. For our purpose it is convenient to confuse a branch n0 o n 1 o · · · o nk 
with the sequence of its labels L1 o · · · o Lk or with its literal set { L1, ... , Lk}. A substitution 
is applied to a branch by applying it to its labels in the obvious way; similarly it is applied to 
a tree by application to all its branches. A literal tree T' is obtained from a literal tree T by 
extension with a clause L1 V ... V Ln at a branch b iff 
T' = T - { b} U { b o li I i = 1 ... n and li is labelled with Li} 
In this case we also say that T' contains a clause L1 V ... V Lk rooted at b. 
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The term "to close a branch, means to attach an additional label"*" to its leaf in order to 
indicate that the branch is proved to be T -complementary. A branch is open iff it is not labelled 
in that way. 
Definition 4.1 (T-model elimination) Let M be a clause set and T be a theory. An initial 
model elimination tableau for M with top clause C is a literal tree that results from extending 
the empty tree (the tree that contains only the empty branch) with the the clause C. 
A model elimination tableau (ME tableau) for M is either an initial ME tableau or a literal 
tree obtained by a single application of one of the following inference rules to a ME tableau T: 
Partial extension step: (cf. figure 1) Let b = Lt o ... o Lk-t o Lk be an open branch in T . 
Suppose there exist new variants Ci = Kl V ... V Kij (i = 1 ... n) of clauses in M. 
These clauses are called the extending clauses and the sequence Kf o · · · o K~ is called 
the extending literals. 
In order to describe the appending of the extending clauses, we define the literal tree Tn 
and the "actual branch to extend", bn. recursively as follows: if n = 0 then To := T and 
bo := b, else Tn is the literal tree obtained from Tn-1 by extending with the clause Cn at 
bn-1 and bn := bn-t o K!. 
Let K, be a subset of the literal set of bn with Lk, Kf, ... , K! E K. Borrowing a notion 
from ([Sti85]), K, is called the key set. If there exists aT -residue ( q, R) of .C, then partial 
theory extension yields the tree T~. where T~ is obtained from TnC1 by extension with the 
unit clause Rat bnC1· 
Total extension step: This is similar to "partial extension step"; instead of appending a residue, 
the branch is closed. Let b, Ci. Tn and bn and K as in "partial extension step". If there exists 
a T-unifier q forK, and K,q is minimal T-complementary, then total theory extension 
yields the literal tree TnC1, and the branch bnC1 E TnC1 is closed. 
A total extension step with n = 0 is also called reduction step.2 A derivation from M with 
top clause C and length n is a finite sequence of ME tableaux To, T1, ••• , Tn. where To is an 
initial tableau for M with top clause C, and fori= 1 ... n 1i is the tableau obtained from Ti-t 
by one single application of one of the above inference rules with new variants of clauses from 
M. If additionally in Tn every branch is closed then this derivation is called a refutation of M. 
The panial theory model elimination calculus {PTME-calculus) consists of the inference rules 
"partial extension step" and "total extension step"; the total theory model elimination calculus 
(TTME-calculus) consists of the single inference rule "total extension step, (End definition) 
The key sets K, play the role of a semantical justification of each step. The condition L k E K, 
generalizes the condition "the leaf must be one of the complementary literals" from non-theory 
model elimination (section 2). 
In practice it is important that the key sets and residues may be restricted to some typical, 
syntactical form. For example, if the theory is equality, and the calculus shall be instantiated 
with "paramodulation .. , then in the ground case the key sets K, in partial steps are of the form 
K = {L[t], t = uP or K, = { L[t], u = t}, and the residues are of the form (0, L[t +- u]); in 
2This notion is kept for historical reasons 
3 L[t] means that the term t occurs in the literal L, L[t +- u] is the literal that results from replacing one 
occurence oft with u 
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Figure 1: Partial extension step 
total steps it suffices to restrict the key set to the form K, = { L, L} or K, = {...,a = a}. In 
lifting these paramodulation steps to the first-order level, it is neccessary to allow instantiating 
before paramodulation (see e.g. [FHS89]). For example, if {P(x , x),a = b} is a key set, 
then for completeness reasons it might be neccessary to instantiate first with x +- f(y), which 
yields P(f(y), f(y)) and then paramodulate into y which finally yields P(f(b),J(a)). Since 
instantiating is not neccessary in a non-linear setting, this example also shows that inference 
systems for partial theory reasoning must in principle be designed differently than for non-linear 
calculi. 
It should be noted that the order of the extending clauses is immaterial for completeness. 
5 COMPLETENESS 
Besides soundness, which is usually easy to prove, (refutational) completeness is the most 
important demand for a logic calculus. In order to establish such a result for partial theory 
reasoning, the theory reasoning component must be taken care of. 
In our viewpoint, the computation of the residues in partial extension steps, and the compu-
tation of the substitutions in total extension steps should be described by a "theory calculus" with 
two respective inference rules: the one derives from a key set a residue, and the other derives 
from a key set a theory-unifier. In order to establish the completeness of the overall calculus, 
the theory calculus itself must be "complete". However, in order to formulate this we do not 
want to fix to a certain calculus; instead we will use the following abstract characterization. 
Definition 5.1 Let T be a theory and S1 be a ground T -unsatisfiable literal set. Suppose that 
some Lo E S1 is contained in some minimal T -unsatisfiable subset of S1. The theory T is 
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called acceptable iff there exist finite sequences 
such that fori= 1 ... n: 
1. Li-1 E Ki, Ki ~ Si and (Li, ui) is aT-residue of Ki. 
2. Si+l := Siui U {Li}. 
3. Ln E Kn+l. Kn+l ~ Sn+h and Kn+l O'n+l is minimal T-complementary. 
4. For every4 Kf ~ Ki there exists a residue ( Liui) such that Li ~ Li and ui ~ O'i. 
5. For every K~+l ~ Kn+l there exists aT unifier u~+I ~ O'n+l for K~+I· 
and 
and 
An acceptable theory is called acceptable and total iff n = 0 for all L0 and S1 satisfying the 
precondition. (End definition) 
The idea behind items 1. - 3. is to stepwisely modify an initially chosen goal L0, leading 
to L1, L2, ... , Ln until a contradiction is obvious (The presence of unifiable and syntactical 
complementary literals might be such a case, or, in equational reasoning, the presence of a 
literal -.s = t where s and t are unifiable ). The Kis have the same meaning as the key sets 
in the definition of theory model elimination. In the first chain of the introductory example in 
the previous section, n = 1, S1 = {a < b, b < c, c < a}, Lo = a < b, K1 = {a < b, b < c }, 
(ut,LI) = (0,a <c), S2 ={a< b,b < c,c <a, a< c}, K2 = {c <a, a< c} and u2 = 0. 
This strategy can also be roughly explained in linear resolution terminology: L1 plays the role 
of the top clause, and the Li+l are derived from the near parent Li and a collection of far parent 
clauses Ki ~Si. 
Note that although S1 is a ground set, substitutions are involved. This is, because V-quantified 
variables might be introduced in the residues and thus the Si (j > 1) might no longer be ground. 
Items 4. is the lifting requirements for the residues, and item 5. is the lifting requirement for 
the concluding unifier. 
Now we can turn to completeness of theory model elimination. In an attempted model 
elimination refutation it is essential to pick a suitable clause for the initial tableau. For example, 
if S = {A, B, -.B} then no proof can be found when the initial tableau is built from A. What 
we need is expressed in the completeness theorem: 
Theorem 5.1 (Completeness of partial theory model elimination) Let T be an acceptable 
theory and M be a T -unsatisfiable clause set. Let C E M be such that C is contained in some 
minimal T -unsatisfiable subset of M. Then there exists a PTME refutation of M with top clause 
C. 
The completeness of TIME follows as a corollary of PTME if the theory reasoner can find 
a T-unifier in one step, or, more technically: 
4 K' $ K iff 36 : K' 6 = K and u' $ u iff 36 : u' 6ldom( u) = u 
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Corollary 1 Let M and Cas in the previous theorem and T be an acceptable and total theory. 
Then there exists a TIME refutation of M with top clause C. 
The completeness proof employs the standard technique of proving first the ground case and 
then lifting to the variable case. Thus we apply a theory-version of the Skolem-Herbrand-Gooel 
theorem. Such a theorem only holds for universally quantified formula. This fact explains our 
restriction to clausal theories. 
Since the main difficulties are in the ground proof, we will omitt lifting here. For the ground 
proof we need the following notion: a clause C E M in an T -unsatisfiable clause set M is called 
essential in M iff M - { C} is not T -unsatisfiable. Note that not every T -unsatisfiable clause 
set has an essential literal, e.g. {A, -.A, B, -.B} is 0-unsatisfiable but deleting any element 
results in a still 0-unsatisfiable set. However every literal in a minimal T -unsatisfiable set is 
essential. 
Lemma 5.1 Let M be a T-unsatisfiable ground clause set, with L, Lt V ... V Ln EM being 
essential. Define Mi = M- {Lt V. -.. V Ln} U {Li} (fori = 1 ... n). Then every Mi is 
T -unsatisfiable and the clauses L and Li are essential in some Mi (1 ::5 j ::5 n). 
This lemma is needed in the proof of the following ground completeness lemma: 
Lemma 5.2 Let T be a theory and M be a T -unsatisfiable ground clause set with essential 
clause C. Then there exists a TIME refutation of M with top clause C. 
Proof For convenience some terminology is introduced: if we speak of"replacing a clause Ct 
in a derivation by a clause C2'' we mean the derivation that results from replacing some specific 
occurence of C1 by C2, which must be a superset of Cl, in every tableau in the derivation. By a 
"derivation of a clause £ 1 V ... V Ln" we mean a derivation that ends in a tableau which in turn 
contains n open branches ending in brother leafs Lt, ... , Ln. Furthermore, if D 1 is a derivation 
of a clause C and D2 is a derivation with top clause C, then by "appending Dt and D2" we 
mean the derivation that results from extending D 1 with the inferences of D2 in order, where 
one specific occurence of C in D 1 takes the role of the top clause C in D2• 
Let k( M) denote the number of occurences of literals in M minus the number of clauses 
in M (k(M) is called the excess literal parameter in ([AB70])). Now we prove the claim by 
induction on k( lv.l). 
In the induction base k( M) = 0. Then M must be a set of unit clauses, i.e. a literal set. 
Now set Lo = C and consider definition (5.1). The sequences defined there can be mapped to a 
refutation as follows: the initial tableau consists of Lo. The T-residues (o-1 , £ 1), ... , (o-n, Ln) 
of the respective sets Kt, ... , Kn are mapped to n partial extension steps as follows: in step i 
choose as the key set Ki, as extending literals Ki- {Li-t}, and as residue ( O"i, Li). A final total 
extension step with key set Kn+l and extending literals Kn+l - {Ln} and substitution O"n+t 
yields the desired refutation. 
To complete the induction assume now that k( M) > 0 and that the result holds for sets M' 
with k( M') < k( M). We need a further case analyses. 
Case 1: C is a non-unit clause of the form C = L V R 1 V ... V Rn. Define 
Ml, -
MR 
(M- {C}) U {L} 




Both M£ and MR. are unsatisfiable, since otherwise a model for one of them were a model for 
M, which contradicts the assumption that M is unsatisfiable. Find a minimal T-unsatisfiable 
ML c M£ that contains L. Such a set must exist, because otherwise M£ - { L} C M were 
7-unsatisfiable, and with C ~M£ it follows that C is not essential in M. Since ML is minimal 
7-unsatisfiable L is essential in M£. Since k(ML) < k(M) we can apply the induction 
hypothesis and obtain a refutation DL of ML with top clause L. We may assume that DL is 
in the following normal form: in every extension or reduction step, L does not occur as an 
extending clause. Such a normal form can always be achieved, since L is the top clause, and 
thus in every step the extending clause L can be replaced by the ancestor clause L. 
By the same argumentation as for L, the clause R1 V ... V Rn is essential in MR. and since 
k(MR) < k(M) we can apply the induction hypothesis again and obtain a refutation DR of MR 
with top clause R1 V ... V Rn. 
Now replace in DR every occurence of the clause R1 V ... V Rn by LV R1 V ... V Rn. 
Call this derivation DR,. DR. is derivation of several occurences of a clause L from M with top 
clause LV R 1 V ... V Rn. Now append DR. with DL as many times until all these occurences of 
the clause L are closed. Since DL is in the above normal form, the clause Lis no longer used 
in this final derivation. Thus we obtain the desired refutation of M. 
Case 2: C is a unit clause C = K. Since k(M) > 0, M contains a non-unit clause 
D. We distinguish two cases. In the first (and trivial) case, D is not essential in M. Thus 
M' = M - { D} is T-unsatisfiable. But C is still essential in M', because otherwise it were not 
essential in M either. Since k(M') < k(M) the refutation as claimed exists by the induction 
hypothesis. 
In the other case D is essential in M. By lemma (5.1) D contains a literal L such that 
ML = (M- {D}) U {L} is T-unsatisfiable, and K and L are essential in M£. It holds that 
k(ML) < k(M). Thus by the induction hypothesis there exists a refutation DK of ML with 
top clause K. D is of the form D = LV R1 V ... V Rn. Since Lis essential in ML and 
k(ML) < k(M) there exists by the induction hypothesis a refutation DL of ML with top clause 
L. As for DL in case 1 above, the set DL here can be assumed to be in the same normal form, 
i.e. L is not used as an extending clause in any inference step. 
Let MR = (M- {D}) U {R1 V ... V Rn}. By the same argumentation as in case 1, MR 
is T-unsatisfiable and R1 V ... V Rn is essential in MR, and by the induction hypothesis there 
exists a refutation DR of MR with top clause R 1 V ... V Rn. 
Now we can put things together. First replace in DK every occurence of the clause L by D. 
The result is a derivation DK of several occurences of a clause R 1 V ... V Rn from M with top 
clause K. Now append DK with DR as many times until all occurences of R 1 V ... V Rn in 
DK are closed. Since R1 V ... V Rn may be used in DR several times, the result is a refutation 
D'k of MU { R1 V ... V Rn} with top clause K. In order to turn D'k into a refutation of M first 
replace in D'k every occurence of the clause R1 V ... V Rn by D. This results in a derivation 
D'J( of several occurences of the clause L from M. In order to turn this into a refutation, append 
D'J( with DL as many times until all occurences of L are closed. Since DL is in the above 
normal form, the clause L is no longer used in this final derivation. Thus we obtain the desired 
refutation of M. o 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a partial and a total variant of the model elimination calculus for theory 
reasoning and proved their completeness. For this purpose we gave a sufficient completeness 
criterion for the theory reasoning system, but left open the question how such a system can be 
obtained from a given theory. This is currently being investigated ([Bau92b]). Finally I would 
like to thank U. Furbach for reading an earlier draft of this paper. 
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A New Sorted Logic 
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Abstract: We present a sound and complete calculus for an expressive sorted first-order 
logic. Sorts are extended to the semantic and pragmatic use of unary predicates. A sort 
may denote an empty set and the sort structure can be created by making use of the 
full first-order language. Technically spoken, we allow sort declarations to be used in the 
same way than ordinary atoms. Therefore we can compile every first-order logic formula 
into our logic. 
The extended expressivity implies an extended sorted inference machine. We present 
a new unification algorithm and show that the declarations the unification algorithm is 
built on have to be changed dynamically during the deduction process. Deductions in 
the resulting resolution calculus are very efficient compared to deductions in the unsorted 
resolution calculus. The approach is a conservative extension of the known sorted ap-
proaches, as it simplifies to the known sorted calculi if we apply the calculus to the much 
more restricted input formulas of these calculi. 
Keywords: Automated Reasoning, Sorted Reasoning, Sorted Unification 
1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the introduction of "sorts", e.g. see [11, 8, 13, 3, 4, 1] in first-order 
logic results in a more efficient resolution calculus and a more natural representation of 
problems. Although the second statement depends on the personal taste, there are many 
examples in the literature, where a sorted formalization of a problem leads to shorter 
proofs and a less branching search space. In all of the approaches mentioned above, sorts 
correspond to unary predicates in unsorted first-order logic. For example in the logic of 
[13] the sort "declaration" f(xs)~S is logically equivalent to the clause S(x) ::::?- S(f(x)). 
1This research was supported by the ESPRIT project MEDLAR (3125) of the European Community 
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This simple example shows the advantages of a sorted formalization: less literals and 
less resolution possibilities. In particular, for this simple example there are infinitely 
many (self) resolution possibilities in the unsorted version, whereas there are no possible 
resolution steps in the sorted version. 
The logic presented in this paper follows the lines of [11, 8, 13]. It extends the work 
of Schmidt-SchauB [8] in three directions 
• We allow conditioned declarations, i.e. declarations can be used as ordinary atoms, 
e.g. the conditioned declaration i(xp, YT )--EP ::::? YT--EP expresses that if x is a 
theorem and y a proposition and x implies y, then y is a theorem. The sort P 
denotes the set of all theorems and the function i denotes implication (see Example 
2.4). 
• Sorts may denote empty sets, i.e. we also have to consider interpretations where the 
empty set is assigned to a sort. 
• We have a fixed sort symbol T which denotes the top sort "Any". 
Our way of reasoning is the same as in [11, 8]. We choose a set of declarations which 
is fixed in [11, 8] from the beginning but dynamic in our approach. We exploit the 
declarations in a sorted unification algorithm and modify standard deduction rules (e.g. 
resolution) by considering sorted unifiers only. 
Compared to our own work [13] we have simplified the semantics by considering total 
functions only and we have replaced the unsorted unification algorithm by a sorted version. 
The difference between our approach and the work of [3, 4, 1] is that we do not 
separate formulas containing declarations only from the rest of the formulas. This allows 
for a more efficient calculus, because we incorporate all declarations in sorted reasoning, 
whereas [3, 4, 1] do not consider declarations occurring in the formula part (in fact [4] 
does not allow for such declarations) in the sorted reasoning process. Therefore they need 
more and less restrictive inference rules. Besides they only give algorithms for simple or 
elementary [8] sort structures, whereas our approach applies to arbitrary. sort structures. 
Because of the generality of our approach, we are able to compile every formula of 
first-order logic into a formula of our sorted logic, i.e. in general we get a smaller set of 
formulas (but never larger) and are able to apply our much more efficient calculus. In 
subsection 2.3 we will give the foundations of this compilation. 
We have tried to keep the theory in this paper simple. Technical lemmas and proofs 
have been skipped. They can be found in [12]. Instead, we provide key examples in 
order to justify our results. The paper now first explains the syntax and semantics of 
the logic and relates the logic to unsorted first-order logic. Then we introduce our sorted 
unification algorithm and the rules of the resolution calculus. We end with a solution to 
an example (see Example 2.4) and some conclusions. 
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2 The Logic .Cs 
2.1 Syntax 
A signature :E: = (S, V, F, P) contains a set of sort symbols in addition to the usual sets 
V of variable symbols, F of function symbols and P of predicate symbols. The fixed sort 
T is always inS and the 2-place predicate~ is always in P. Variables are indexed with 
their sort, e.g. xs, yw. 
Terms and atoms are built in the usual unsorted way with the addition that if t is 
a term and S a sort symbol, then t~S is an atom. Atoms of the form t~S are called 
declarations. Atoms of the form t~ T are forbidden, because they are not useful and 
complicate the theory. From atoms we construct literals and formulas using the logical 
connectives. A clause is a set of literals which is interpreted as the universal closure of 
the disjunction of the literals. 
The set of all terms is denoted by T:E. Substitutions are total functions O": V-+ T:E 
such that the set DOM(O"): = {xs I O"(xs) # xs} is finite. The application of substitutions 
can be extended to terms, formulas, and clauses in the usual ·way. With COD(O") we denote 
the codomain of O", COD(O"): = O"(DOM(O")). Finally, we assume that there is a function 
V which maps terms, formulas and sets of such objects to their variables and a function 
Sorts which maps terms, formulas and sets of such objects to the sorts assigned to the 
variables occurring in these objects. 
2.2 Semantics 
In order to define the semantics for .Cs, we have to assign a set of objects from the 
non-empty universe to every sort symbol and a total function to every function symbol. 
~ is interpreted as the membership relation and we interpret predicates and the logical 
connectives as in unsorted first-order logic. 
Let :E be a signature. An interpretation 8' consists of a non-empty carrier set A, a 
total function fs:1: An -+ A for every function symbol f EF n, a set S'21 ~ A for every sort 
S, and Ts:1: =A. The interpretation 8' assigns an element of Ss:1 to every variable x5 . An 
interpretation S'{xsfa} is like 8' except that it maps xs to a, if aES'2J. Furthermore, 8' as-
signs an n-ary relation Ps:1 ~ An to every n-place predicate symbol P and the membership 
relation to~, such that for every formula F, tET:E, SES, and PEPn: 
• 8' F P(tb · · ., tn) 
• 8' F t~S 
• 8' f= Vxs F 
• 8' f= 3xs F 
iff (S'h(ti), ... , S'h(tn))EP'2J. 
iff S'h(t)ESs:1 
i:ff for all aESs:1, 8'{ xs /a} f= F 
i:ff there exists an aESs:1, S'{xsfa} f= F 
• The logical connectives are interpreted in the usual way. 
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2.3 Relativization 
In this subsection we show how to transform formulas of .Cs into unsorted first-order logic. 
We can use the equivalences 
Vxs :F {:} VxT (xT~S::} :F) 
3xs :F {:} 3xT (xT~S A :F) 
in order to eliminate variables of sorts different from T, then erase the sorts of the variables 
and transform each atom t~S into S(t). The unsorted first-order formula obtained is 
logically equivalent to the sorted formula [12]. 
If we use these steps in reverse order, we can also translate every unsorted first order 
logic formula in our logic. For arbitrary formulas this process might not be useful, but it 
works fine for clauses. 
2.4 Example: Condensed Detachment 
Condensed detachment is an inference rule that combines modus ponens and instantiation 
[7]. The general technique is to code various problems into the term structure of first-
order logic. Thus we only need one predicate symbol P expressing "is a theorem". Solving 
examples of this form with an automated theorem prover can be arbitrarily hard [6]. The 
example presented in the following is from the two-valued sentential calculus where the 
2-place function i denotes implication and the 1-place function n negation. We start with 
an unsorted formalization. 
(1) Vx,y(P(i(x,y)) A P(x)=}P(y)) 
(2) Vx,y,z P(i(i(x,y),i(i(y,z),i(x,z)))) 
(3) Vx P(i(i(n(x),x),x)) 
(4) Vx,y P(i(x,i(n(x),y))) 
(5) Vx P(i(x, x)) 
We will prove that ((1) A (2) A (3) A (4))::} (5). But first we compile the unsorted 
formalization into our sorted logic. As there is only one 1-place predicate symbol P, we 
select P and turn it into a sort, attach the sort T (any) to all variables and rewrite atoms 
of the form P(t) to t~P. 
(1) VxT, YT (i(xT, YT ))~P A XT~P)::} YT~p 
(2) VxT, YT, ZT i(i(xT, YT ), i(i(yT, ZT ), i(xT, ZT )))~P 
(3) VxT i(i(n(xT),xT),xT)~P 
(4) VxT, YT i(xT, i(n(xT ), YT ))~P 
(5) VxT i(x, x)~P 
So far the changes have not affected the structure of the formulas, only the syntax. The 
only candidate for applying the relativization backwards is the literal xTt Pin the first 
clause. As we have P C T (C denotes the subsort relation, Pis a subsort ofT by definition 
of T. In general the subsort relation is decided with respect to a set of declarations, see 
Section 3.1. The compilation process can be automatized [12].), we change the sort of the 
variable XT into xp, delete the literal, negate formula (5), compute clause normal form 
(see [13]) and finally result in the compiled clause set 
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(1) { i(xp, YT ))~ P, YT~P} 
(2) {i(i(xT, YT ), i(i(yT, ZT ), i(xT, ZT )))~P} 
(3) { i( i( n(xT ), XT ), XT )~P} 
( 4) { i(xT, i(n(xT ), YT ))~P} 
(5) {i(a,a)~P} 
It seams that the effect of the compilation is quiet small (in fact for other examples we 
can save more literals) , because we have saved one literal only. But we will show that 
the proof using the compiled clause set is unique whereas the proof using the original 
unsorted clause set requires search in an infinite search space. 
Note that the problem cannot be represented as sort information in any other known 
sorted logic [11, 8, 3, 4, 1), i.e. the occurring declarations can not be processed by their 
sorted inference mechanisms. Therefore applying these sorted calculi to the example is 
like applying the unsorted resolution calculus. 
3 The Calculus C£s 
We will present a resolution based calculus for £ 5 . In [12) we have shown how to transform 
sentences of £s into clauses. So our starting point here is a set of clauses CS. 
The difference between a sorted and an unsorted calculus is the different processing 
of unary predicates. The corresponding atoms are either viewed as declarations or the 
name of the predicate is attached as a sort to a variable. For example, the unsorted 
clause {•S(x),P(x,a)} can be compiled to the sorted clause {P(xs,a)}. If we want to 
instantiate a sorted variable, we have to check the well sortedness of the instantiation. 
Therefore we need a different (sorted) unification algorithm. For example, in order to 
perform a resolution step between the literals P(xs,a) and •P(a,a) we must guarantee 
that a has sort S. The declaration a~S would provide the necessary information. Thus 
the unification algorithm checks well sortedness of assignments to variables with respect 
to a set L~ of declarations. 
In our approach the interesting question is which declarations we must consider during 
unification. Note that declarations may not only occur in unit clauses (e.g. { a~S}) but 
also mixed with other literals (e.g. { a~S, P( a, a)} or { a~S, a~T} ). 
In the calculi of [11, 8), declarations occurred only in the declaration part of the logic. 
This corresponds to unit clauses containing a declaration as their literal in £ 5 . We will 
see that it is not sufficient to only consider declarations occurring in unit clauses during 
unification. Instead, we must also consider declarations occurring in non unit clauses in 
order to obtain a complete calculus. The following example demonstrates this fact. 
Consider the clause set CS= { {P(xA)}, {P(xB)}, { •P(a)}, { •P(b)}, {a~A, b~B} }. 
If we only take unit declarations into account, we have L~ = 0 and therefore all sorts are 
considered to be empty. There is no well sorted resolution step, but CS is unsatisfiable. 
We will now develop the necessary notions for the presentation of our unification 
algorithm. The example shows that we have to consider declarations which occur in non 
unit clauses, i.e. declarations which are "conditioned". Thus we introduce the notion 
of a conditioned declaration (conditioned term, conditioned substitution) which is a pair 
(t~S, C) ((t, C), (u, C)) where C is a set of literals. 
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3.1 The Unification Algorithm 
Definition 3.1 (Conditioned Well Sorted Terms) Let L~ be a set of conditioned 
declarations. Then the set of conditioned well sorted terms (we use the abbreviation 
"cws." for conditioned well sorted) Ti~.s of sort S is recursively defined by: 
• for every variable xsEV, (xs, 0)ETi~.s 
• for every conditioned declaration (t-E:S, C)EL~, (t, C)ETi~.s 
• for every conditioned well sorted term (t, C)ETi~.s (S # T), substitution u: = 
{xs1 ~--+ tt, ... , xsn 1-+ tn}, with (ti, Ci)ETi~.s;' (U Ci) ~ D for some finite set of 
literals D, (u(t), u(C) U D)ETi~.s 
• for every term t we have (t, 0)ETI.~,T 
We define TL~,s: = {(t, 0) I (t, 0)ET~~.8}. With T~~,gr,S we denote the set of cws. 
ground terms of sort S. Obviously T~~.gr,S = {(t, C) I (t, C)ET~~.s and t is ground }. 
Thus we always have TL~,gr,T = T~~.gr,T # 0, T~~,gr,S ~ T~~,8 , and TL~,s ~ T~~.s· 
Often we are not interested in the condition part of a conditioned object. We say that 
tET~ 8 , if there is a set of literals C such that (t, C) ET~ 8 . Similarly we say that a ~· ~· declaration (t-ES)EL~, if there is a set of literals C such that (t-E:S, C)EL~ and (if not 
necessary) we do not mention the conditioned part of a conditioned substitution. 
A cws. substitution uc = ( u, C) (with respect to a set of declarations L~) con-
sists of a substitution u and a finite set of literals C such that for every xs;EDOM(u), 
(u(xs;), Ci)ET~~.s; and (U Ci) ~C. 
For the unification algorithm it is useful to define a binary relation ~ which denotes 
the subsort relationship. If S and T are sorts, we define S C T iff there exists a variable 
Xs with xsETcL T· ~· We use the standard notations [9, 8] for the presentation of our unification algorithm: 
a unification problem r is a set of equations r = { tl = St, ... 'tn = sn}· A substitution 
U solves a unification problem f = {tt = SI,···,tn = Sn}, iff u(tt) = u(st), ... ,u(tn) = 
u(sn)· A unification problem r is called solved, iff r = {xsl = tt, ... 'Xsn = tn}, each Xs; 
is a variable, Xs;~V(tj), and xs; # xs,· for every i and j and tiET~ 5 .. ~·. 
Algorithm 3.2 (The Sorted Unification Algorithm) The input of the algorithm is 
a unification problem f which is changed by the following thirteen rules until it is solved 




( 4) Orientation 
(5) Clash 
(6) Cycle 
(7) Empty Sort 
(8) Sorted Fail 
vv 








{xs = t} u {xsf-+t}r 
if xs is a variable, t a non-variable term and 
xs~V(t)~ xsEV(f) 
tt=xsjur 
Xs = t U f 
if xs is a variable and t a non-variable term 
{f(tb ... 'tn~ = g(sb ... 'sm)} u r 
s OP.FAIL 
if f # g 




if there exists a variable xsEV(f) such that T~~ ,gr,s = 0 
{xs = YTlU f 
STOP.F IL 
ifS# T, T # T, Yr~TcL 8 and xs~TcL T and there is ~· ~· 
no common subsort of S and T and there are no condi-
tioned declarations (f(s1 , ... , sn)~S')EL~, S' CS and 
(f(t1, .. . , tn)~T')EL~, T' ~ T 
{xs = f~tb ... 'tn)} u r 
S10P.FAIL 
ifS# T, xs~V(f(t1, .. . , tn)), f(tb .. . , tn)~T~~,s and 
there is no declaration (f(sb ... , sn)~S')EL~, S' ~ S 
ur 
if S -=f. T, xs~V(f(tb ... , tn)), f(tb ... , tn)~TL~,s 
and there is a conditioned declaration (!( 81, ... , 







ifS=/: T, T =/: T, xsrtTL~,T and YTrtTL~,s and V is a 
maximal sort with VC Sand VC T 
{xs = YT} U :f 
{xs = f(S)} u {yT = JW)} u {sl = tl, ... 'Sn = tn} u r 
ifS =/: T, T :f. T, YTrtTL~,s and xsrtTL~,T and there 
are conditioned declarations (f(s1, ... , sn)~S')EL~, 
S' ~Sand (f(t11 .•• , tn)~T')EL~, T' ~ T and S' ~ T' 
and T' ~ S' where 8 = sl, ... , Sn and r = tl, ... , tn 
Every declaration t~T taken from L~ must be completely renamed with new variables 
before it is used in a unification step. The rules (1)-(6) implement the unsorted Robinson 
unification algorithm. 
In order to compute a cws. substitution from a solved unification problem, we have 
to do the following. Let r = {xsl - tl, ... 'Xsn = tn} be the solved unification problem, 
then a:= { xs1 ~ t1, .. . , xsn ~ tn}" is the corresponding unconditioned unifier. ac: = 
(a, cl u ... u Cn) is a most general cws. unifier, if we have (ti, Ci)ET~ S·. Therefore a ~·. 
solved unification problem may lead to several (but only finitely many if L~ is finite) cws. 
mgu's. 
The presented algorithm is a complete and correct unification algorithm. Complete 
means that for every cws. ground substitution re = ( r, C) solving a unification problem 
r (where DOM(r) is restricted to V(r))the unification algorithm computes a cws. substi-
tution ac such that there exists a cws. ground substitution ).C with ).C(ac) =re. As the 
presented unification algorithm is an extension of the unification algorithm of Schmidt-
Schauf3 [8] it may produce infinitely many unifiers and the problem whether two terms 
can be unified is undecidable. Questions of the form tETcL 5 , TcL 9 5 = 0 are decidable -E-' -Eo, r, 
in quasi-linear time [12]. 
3.2 The Inference Rules 
In order to apply the inference rules, we need a function Empty which computes from a 
set of sorts a set of sets of literals (conditions), such that each set of literals guarantees 
the sorts to be non empty. We assume that Empty computes a minimal, finite set of 
conditions with respect to set inclusion. This can be done by constructing appropriate 
ground terms according Definition 3.1. 
Definition 3.3 (Factorization Rule) Let C = {L1, .. . , Ln} be a clause, {Li, Lj} ~ C 
(i =/: j), and ac =(a, D) a cws. mgu of {Li, Lj}, i.e. a(Li) = a(Lj), EEEmpty(Sorts(C) \ 
Sorts( a( C))), then 
a( C) u DuE 
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is called a factor of C. 
Definition 3.4 (Resolution Rule) Let C1 and C2 be two clauses with no variables in 
common, LECI and KEC2· We define C~: =cl\ {L} and C~: = c2 \ {K}. If there exists 
a cws. mgu uc = (u, D) of Land K such that u(L) and u(K) become two complementary 
literals, EEEmpty(Sorts(C) \ Sorts(u(C~ U en)), then 
u( C~ u C~) u D u E 
is a resolvent of C1 and C2. 
The correctness of the rules follows immediately from their form and the correctness 
of the unification algorithm [12]. 
Now the remaining question is which declarations we have to take into account for the 
unification algorithm in order to preserve completeness. The general idea is to reduce the 
number of declarations, because this restricts the applicability of inference rules, whence 
the search space. The previous example shows that we have to consider at least one of 
the literals { a<EA, b<EB}. In general we must choose one declaration from each clause 
containing declarations only. We call such clauses declaration clauses. Choosing the 
declarations has to be done dynamically during the derivation process, i.e. if we have 
derived a new declaration clause, we have to extend the well sorted terms using one of 
these declarations. 
Theorem 3.5 (Completeness Theorem) Let CS be a clause set. We choose L<E: = 
{(ti<ESi, C[)} such that for each declaration clause CiECS we choose exactly one declara-
tion ti<ESi with Ci = {ti~Si} u C[. 
If CS is unsatisfiable, there exists a derivation of the empty clause using resolution 
and factorization. The set L<E must be updated every time a new declaration clause is 
derived. 
Again we consider the clause set of the previous example. CS= { {P(xA)}, {P(xB)}, 
{ ..,p( a)}, { ..,P(b)}, { a<EA, b<EB}}. If we choose L<E: = {(a<EA, {b<EB})} then there is only 
one possible resolution step between {P(xA)} and {...,P(a)} with cws. mgu ({xA ~--+a}, 
{b<EB}) and Empty( {A}) = {{b<EB}} resulting in {b<EB}. This clause subsumes the 
clause {a<EA,b<EB} and we obtain the new clause set {{P(xA)}, {P(xB)}, {-,P(a)}, 
{ ..,p(b)}, {b<EB} }. We have to change L<E into L<E: = {(b<EB, 0)}. Again only one resolu-
tion step between {P(xB)} and {...,P(b)} with cws. mgu ({xB~--+b}, 0) and Empty({B}) = 
{0} is possible which yields the empty clause. 
3.3 Solving the Example 
We solve the problem using a set of support strategy. The problem is not a hard problem, 
e.g. OTTER [5] can solve the problem in less than one second. But we will show that 
in the sorted formalization the problem can be solved without any search. Here is the 
compiled clause set 
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(1) {i(xp, YT ))t P, YT~P} 
(2) {i(i(xT, YT ), i(i(yT, ZT ), i(xT, ZT )))~P} 
(3) {i(i(n(xT),xT),xT)~P} 
( 4) { i(xT, i(n(xT ), YT ))~P} 
(5) {i(a,a)tP} 
The initial set of support consists of the clause {i(a, a)t P} only. Following Theorem 3.5 
we choose the set of declarations L~ = { ( 2) 1, ( 3) 1, ( 4) 1} (We use the format (clause )literal 
to refer to literals in clauses). As no conditioned declarations need to be considered, we 
have Tt~,P = T~~,P and thus the additional notations needed to represent conditioned 
objects are skipped. The only applicable inference step is resolution with (1 )2, because 
unification with one of the literals (2)1, (3)1 or ( 4)1 results in a function symbol clash. 
The corresponding unification problem is 
ro = {YT = i(a, a)} 
which is still in solved form, as i(a, a)ETt~,T· Thus we add the new clause 
(6) {i(xp,i(a,a))tP} 
to the set of support. The new clause cannot be resolved with clauses (2) and ( 4) because 
of a function symbol clash and unification with the literal (3)1 results in the unification 
problem 
rl = {xp = i(n(xT),xT),XT = i(a,a)} 
which cannot be well sorted solved, because i(n(i(a,a)),i(a,a))~Tt~,P and the term 
i(n(i(a,a)),i(a,a)) cannot be further weakened. Thus again the only possible step is 
resolution with clause (1) giving 
(7) {i(xp,i(x~,i(a,a)))tP} 
Trying to build a resolvent between (7) and (3) or ( 4) again leads to unification problems 
which cannot be well sorted solved. Resolution with clause (2) results in the unification 
problem 
r2 = {xp = i(xT,YT),x~ = i(yT,ZT),XT = a,ZT =a} 
Applying the rule Application of the unification algorithm using the equations XT = a 
and ZT = a twice, we obtain 
r3 = {xp = i(a,yT),x~ = i(yT,a),XT = a,ZT =a} 
We don't have i(a,yT)ETt~,P or i(yT,a)ETt~,P· Application of Weakening VT to the 
equation xp = i(a, YT) using the declaration i(xT, i(n(xT ), YT ))~P gives 
r4 = {xp = i(a,yT),x~ = i(yT,a),XT = a,ZT =a, 
YT = i(n(x;.),y;.),x;. =a} 
Following the rule Application we use the new equations YT = i(n(x;.),y;.) and x;. =a 
as substitutions and result in 
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rs {xp = i(a,i(n(a),y~)),xp = i(i(n(a),y~),a), 
XT = a,zT = a,yT = i(n(a),y~),x~ =a} 
The first equation is now well sorted solved, i.e. i(a,i(n(a),y~))ETL~,P· But for the 
second equation we still have i(i(n(a), y~), a)~TL~,P· Applying Weakening VT using the 
declaration i(i(n(xT),xT),xT)~P solves this last problem. 
r6 {xp = i(a,i(n(a),y~)),xp = i(i(n(a),y~),a), 
XT = a,zT = a,yT = i(n(a),y~),x~ =a, 
i(i(n(a), y~ ), a)= i(i(n(x~ ), x~ ), x~)} 
After application of the rules Decomposition, Orientation, and Application to the equation 
i(i(n(a), y~ ), a)= i(i(n(x~ ), x~ ), x~) and it's descendants we finish in the solved problem 
r7 {xp = i(a,i(n(a),a)),xp = i(i(n(a),a),a), 
XT = a,zT = a,yT = i(n(a),a),x~ =a, 
y~ = a,x~ =a)} 
and derive 
(8) 0 
Note that the solution of the unification problem r 2 is unique and computationally simple. 
Comparing our solution to the proof found by OTTER (Version 2.0, binary resolution), 
we needed only 3 steps to refute the clause set, while OTTER made 5 steps. The missing 2 
steps occur in the solution of the unification problem r 2 • The most important difference 
is that the sorted proof was found without any search (neither during unification nor 
during the application of the inference rules), i.e. we have not generated useless resolvents. 
OTTER produced 60 clauses to find the empty clause. 
4 Discussion 
We have presented a sound and complete calculus CCs for a new sorted first-order logic Cs. 
The resolution calculus established by Theorem 3.5 is the most general, most restrictive 
(with regard to the number of applicable inference steps), completely given calculus we 
know for sorted logics. Note that the indeterminism of Theorem 3.5, i.e. which declarations 
to choose for L~ is not really an indeterminism. It corresponds to a case analysis. Thus 
if a declaration clause is needed in a proof, all declarations will be dynamically chosen 
during the deduction process. Nevertheless there are a lot questions left open, e.g. how 
to extend this calculus by equality reasoning. 
Compared to the frameworks of Stickel [10] and Biirckert [2] the presented calculus 
is not an instance of them. Both frameworks require the a priori, static separation of a 
background theory, in our case the sort theory. Completeness of the calculus CCs relies 
on the dynamic change of the sort theory during the deduction process. 
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Abstract 
Along the line of the science of reasoning proposed by Alan Bundy [8], we 
present in this paper a computational theory accounting for human formal 
deductive competence. Our goal is primarily twofold. For one thing, it is 
aimed to establish an explanatory framework for human theorem proving. 
Devised as a computational theory, for another thing, it should also set up 
a theoretical foundation for deductive systems which simulate the way in 
which human beings carry out reasoning tasks. As such, the hope is to arrive 
at systems which learn and plan, which share their experiences with human 
users in high level communications. The last requirement, we believe, makes 
such systems ultimately useful. 
As a computational model, we cast the cognitive activities involved in 
theorem proving as an interleaving process of metalevel planning and object 
level verification. Within such a framework, emphasis is put on three kinds 
of tactics concerning three kinds of declarative knowledge structures. We also 
account for the acquisition of new tactics and methods, as well as the modi-
fications of existing tactics and methods to suit novel problems. While the 
fundamental framework is sketched out formally, the mechanisms manipulat-
ing tactics and methods are only intended to be suggestive, achieved with the 
help of examples. 
"This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 314 (D2, D3) 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, we propose a new computational theory accounting for human formal 
deductive competence, as opposed to theories accounting for human daily reasoning. 
As such, it is a response to Alan Bundy's call for a science of reasoning [8]. As 
our second goal, it should also provide a basis for computational systems which 
reveal many desirable qualities currently lacking in most of the automated reasoning 
systems. These include, for instance, being able to explain a proof in a more human 
oriented manner; being able to benefit from its successful or unsuccessful experiences, 
and thus displaying an evolving reasoning ability; and so on. 
Statically, we cast a reasoning being as a knowledge based system. His reasoning 
competence is exclusively ascribed to the declarative knowledge of various sorts, 
and a set of special purpose reasoning procedures. In this first draft of our theory, 
declarative knowledge includes rules of inference, assertions, and a collection of 
proof schemata, as well as diverse metalevel knowledge. Since it is the combinations 
of chunks of declarative knowledge and reasoning procedures that are planned as 
unit to solve various reasoning tasks, we define these combinations as tactics. The 
total amount of tactics constitutes the basic reasoning repertoire at the disposal of 
a reasoner. The specifications of tactics, which serve as an assessment help in the 
planning process for a proof, are referred to as methods. 
Dynamically, we assume the entire process from the analysis of a problem to the 
completion of a proof, to be an interleaving process of metalevel planning and object 
level verification. In addition, this process is centered around a representational 
structure called a proof tree, which records the current state of the development. 
After setting up a general framework for our computational theory in section 2, 
emphasis is laid on three kinds of object-level tactics and methods in section 3, which 
are best understood and the concepts of metalevel tactics and methods. While the 
former concepts are treated formally, discussions on metalevel tactics and methods 
are intended to be more suggestive rather than formal. We turn to a brief description 
of the dynamic behavior of the interleaving process as a whole in section 4. Finally, 
an outlook of the future development and a discussion on possible applications in 
section 5 concludes this paper. 
2 A Static Description 
In this section, we first categorize the mental objects accommodated in our com-
putational model, together with the corresponding procedures operating on them. 
They are briefly listed below. 
2.1 A Proof Tree 
As a theory conceiving theorem proving as an interleaving process of planning and 
verification, we use a structure of mental representation called a proof tree, to uni-
formly accommodate notions like proof sketches, proof plans and finally, proofs 
themselves. Formally, a proof tree is a tree where every node has four slots, usually 
represented as: 
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<Label,!:::. 1- Derived- Formula, Tactic> 
This means that the derived formula is (can or might be, respectively) derived 
using the tactic indicated, from the children of a node. !:::. stands for the set of 
hypothesis the derived formula depends on. All of the last three slots of a node 
may have the value "unknown", indicating a proof sketch node. The tactic slot, in 
addition, may have the value <the name of a tactic, plan>, indicating a planned 
node; or just the name of a tactic, indicating a verified node. 
2.2 Declarative Knowledge 
The following is a listing of the different kinds of declarative knowledge accommod-
ated in our model: 
• rules of inference, including a kernel of rules innate to human being, usually 
referred to as the natural logic (NL); 
• mathematical formulas collectively called assertions, including axioms, defin-
itions, and theorems, interrelated in a certain conceptual structure [18]; 
• proof schemata, mainly evolving from proofs previously found; 
• metalevel declarative knowledge, specifying possible manipulations on object-
level knowledge, in particular proof schemata. 
Clearly, our theory is a logic based one, built on top of the central hypothesis of 
the existence of a natural logic. Although there are psychological investigations 
which argue against this as a general hypothesis [16, 17], we believe it appropriate 
to assume at least, that the major mode of mathematical reasoning is a logical one. 
2.3 Procedures 
Procedures of diverse varieties are incorporated in our computational model: 
• procedures serving as constituents of tactics and thus called by the planning 
procedures: 
a small set of elementary procedures carrying out various standard object 
level reasoning tasks, via interpreting declarative knowledge; 
an open-end set of special purpose object level reasoning procedures. The 
knowledge needed is interwoven in their algorithms; 
Procedures of this type usually run on a syntactic basis; neither planning nor 
heuristic searching is involved. These procedures are usually called as "basic 
tools" by procedures constructing proofs by planning; 
• procedures not involved in the planning process per se, but partially respons-
ible for the increase of the reasoning repertoire, examples are procedures ac-
counting for the remembrance of proofs or rules of inference. They behave 
similar to perceptive procedures in a theory of general cognition [20]; 
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• autonomous procedures responsible for more complex tasks, such as proof 
construction or proof checking as a whole. Usually, they are animated by 
relevant intentions, and handle by planning, heuristic searching as well as 
trial-and-error to fulfill the intentions. We have to admit that not much is 
known yet about these procedures, and further investigation is needed; 
• other book-keeping procedures, widely ignored in this study (see (22, 20]). 
3 Tactics and Methods 
3.1 General Concepts and Classifications 
The task of tactics is the construction of proof trees. In [8], a tactic can be conceived 
as a well defined computational procedure. Since the concept of declarative know-
ledge plays an important role in our theory, we define tactics to be pairs represented 
as: 
<a reasoning procedure, a collection of declarative knowledge> 
In some cases, such as the special purpose tactics of Bundy [7], the collection 
of knowledge may be empty. In contrast, the three general levels of tactics to be 
introduced below are supported by elementary procedures interpreting standard 
knowledge structure. In the rest of this subsection, we discuss some general features 
along which tactics and methods may vary: 
• A tactic is cognitively primitive, if it does not call other tactics and if its ap-
plication leads to the insertion of an atomic node in the proof tree. We further 
assume, that a verified proof is a tree consisting only cognitively primitive 
tactics. Otherwise, a tactic is cognitively compound; 
• given a goal to be proved and a collection of preconditions, a partial tactic 
only suggests a proof tree with sketch nodes. 
Tactics are usually associated with one or more methods, serving as the specific-
ations of the reasoning ability of a particular tactic [8]. In general, a method has 
the following slots: a preconditions slot specifying the the leaves of the proof trees 
the tactic is intended to construct; and a postconditions slot specifying the root of 
the proof trees. 
Again, we distinguish between complete and partial methods: while the execu-
tion of the corresponding tactic of a complete method will certainly bring about the 
postconditions, if the preconditions are satisfied; this is only likely yet not guaran-
teed, when working with partial methods. 
3.2 Three Levels of General Purpose Tactics and Methods 
at the Object Level 
Vlithin the framework set up so far, we are going to introduce three reasoning 
procedures, which are actually knowledge interpreters. Coupled with chunks of 
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declarative knowledge of the corresponding type, they form tactics at different levels 
of reasoning power. In addition, we suggest some plausible accompanying methods 
consulted by the planning procedures, while trying to put tactics together into a 
proof. 
3.2.1 A Primitive Procedure Applying Rules of Inference 
First and foremost, we are going to introduce a procedure which applies rules of 
inference. To simplify the situation for the current study, we advance a second 
minor hypothesis which assumes the order sorted predicate logic of higher-order as 
the working language. As the natural logic, we have adopted the natural deduction 
system first proposed by Gerhard Gentzen [12, 1]. The following are several most 
important rules: 
6, F f- G DED 6 f- F V G, .z F f- H, 6, G f- H CASE 
li, F ::::} G ' f- H 
Reasoning by applying rules in NL, and rules associated with them in a certain 
pattern [14], are referred to as reasoning at the logic level. While the cognitive 
status of the rules of inference included in the natural logic are said to be elementary 
and innate, a human reasoner may learn new, domain-specific rules. For example, 
a rule about subset might be learned: aESt.StCS2 where "a" "S" and "S" are 
aeS2 ' 1 2 
metavariables of sort "Element" and "Set", respectively. These new rules are said 
to be acquired and compound. For the learning mechanism, see [14]. 
Now for every rule of inference, we have a tactic which applies it, defined by the 
usual matching process. 
3.2.2 Applications of Assertions 
The second kind of important declarative knowledge concerns objects such as ax-
ioms, definitions, lemmata and theorems, and even intermediate results achieved 
during proof searching. They are, in our theory, collectively called assertions. 
?\1oreover, assertions are interrelated in complex conceptual structures [18]. The 
notion of the application of an assertion, though never defined precisely, bears a 
central role in various reasoning activities. One prima facie evidence is that proofs 
found by mathematicians are almost exclusively documented in terms of the applic-
ations of some assertions, i.e. at the assertion level, which is one level above the 
logic level, yet still cognitively elementary. 
Although no introspection is possible to reveal the internal structure of the pro-
cedure applying assertions, in [14], we pinned down this notion after making a crucial 
observation, that every application of an assertion can be expanded to a logic level 
proof segment, referred to as its natural expansion (NE). By studying the natural 
expansions, we came up with a precise characterization of the input-output relation 
for the primitive procedure applying assertions. Formally, the reasoning ability of 
a. tactic applying a certain assertion equals to that of the applications of a set of 
finite compound rules of inference, this makes this concept practically useful [14]. 
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In this paper, it suffices to understand this notion intuitively. For example, given 
an assertion defining subset: 
We may derive a E S~ from a E S~ and S~ ~ S~; 
S~ g S~ from a E S~ and a rf. S~; 
't/ x:ElementX E s~ :::} X E s~ from s~ ~ s~ 
and so on; by applying this definition. 
Although the reasoning power of the application of an assertion can be precisely 
defined [14], it is however not plausible to suggest that the planning decisions are 
made based on this time consuming information. The kind of partial methods we 
believe as one viable approximation can be defined in the following pattern (check 
the example above): 
Method: Application of Assertion A 
• Preconditions: the premises are all either a subformula of A, a specialization1 
thereof, or, thirdly, a negation of the first two cases, 
• Postconditions: the result is either a subformula of A, a specialization 
thereof, or, thirdly, a negation of the first two cases. 
3.2.3 A Procedure Instantiating Proof Schemata 
The third level of tactics is tied to a more novel kind of knowledge structure called 
proof schemata, and a procedure instantiating them. Initially, they might contain 
a complete or partial proof found for a previous problem without metavariables. 
A (partial) specification of the corresponding problem can serve as the associated 
method. Since proof schemata are assumed to be represented mentally as proof 
trees using exclusively cognitively elementary tactics, their applications are usually 
compound tactics. The following is an example. 
Example 1 
After learning a proof showing that the power set P(M) of a set M has a greater 
cardinality than the set itself, by proving that there is no surjective function f : 
111 ~ P(M), the following tactic-method pair might be added to the reasoning 
repertoire. 
Method:Diagonalization-Power-Set-1 
• Precondition: none 
• Post Condition: ·3 f=M-P(M)Surj (!) 
• Tactic: Applying Schema-Diagonalization-Power-Set-l(see below) 
1. !:::. f- Theo; JP 
1 Pa. is defined as the specialization of both 'VzPz and 3zPz 
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1.1. .6' = .6 + -.(Theo) 1- j_;? 
1.1.1. .6' 1- '<~xeP(M)3yeMf(y) = x; def.Surj 
1.1.2 . .6' 1- 3seP(M)VyeMf(y) =f. S; Choice 
1.1.2.1. .6' 1- 3seP(M)'<~xeMX E S {::} x rl. f(x),ComprehensionAxiom 
1.1.2.2 . .6' + '<~xeMX E S {::} x EM 1\ x rl. f(x), 
(abr.S = {x E Mjx fl. f(x)} 
1- 3seP(M)VyeMf(y) =f. S;? 
Notice that the numbering of label serves only to represent the tree structure. For 
example, node 1.1.2 has two children 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2, and node 1.1.2 is also 
derived from its children, by applying the choice rule, as indicated in the tactic slot. 
The tactic slot of each node has the following possible values: the name of a rule 
in the natural logic, like JP, standing for indirect proof; the name of an assertion 
of various sorts, like def.surj or Comprehension Axiom, standing for the application 
of the definition of surjectivity and the comprehension axiom, respectively; or "?", 
standing for "unknown". 
3.3 Metalevel Tactics and Methods 
Our theory is also devised to account for the phenomena that reasoners benefit from 
their successful or unsuccessful experiences. In addition to those more perceptual 
procedures (15], this is achieved mainly through the metalevel tactics. When a 
reasoner is confronted with a novel problem, proof schemata evolving from previous 
proofs are modified to cope with the new problem. Now, we illustrate two types 
of metalevel tactics informally. Guided by declarative knowledge of different kinds, 
they are carried out by two procedures which generalizes or reformulates existing 
proof schemata, respectively. 
Assuming the acquisition of the tactic-method pair in Example 1, we illustrate 
how it can be of use in handling a new problem. For space restriction, only the 
operations will be given, while the intermediate tactics omitted. 
Problem 2 
The interval (0, 1] is not countable, that is, there is no surjective function:/ : 
N ~------+ (0, 1]. 
We now show, how a proof sketch can be arrived at by successive manipulations 
on the tactic gained above. The first step is a reformulation. More exactly, the notion 
of a set is axiomatized now in terms of its characteristic predicate, instead of as an 
object. This reformulation is enabled by a truth-preserving mapping, a meta.level 
declarative knowledge structure coming into play at this point. Concretely in our 
example, the following truth-preserving mapping is used: 
x E S ~------+ S(x) , Subsort(Set , Object) ~------+ Subsort(Set , Predicate) 
where "x" and "S" are metavariables of sort Element and Set. Thus, the definition 
of subset used in our example 
Subsort(Set , Object), V Sl,S2:SetS1 ~ S2 {::} V x:ElementX E S1 :::> X E S2 
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is replaced by 
Subsort(Set, Predicate), 'v' Sl,S2:setS1 ~ S2 <=? 'v' x:ElementS1( X) ::::} S2( X) 
The second reformulation is based on the knowledge that predicates are special 
functions: 
Subsort(Predicate, Fundion ), 'v' P:Predica.te 'v' x:AnyP( X) E { t, f} 
This guarantees the truth-preserving property of the mapping below: 
P(x) ~----+ P(x) = t, -.P(x) ~----+ P(x) = f 
where "P" is a metavariable of sort Predicate, and "x" has the sort of the argument 
sort of P. Formulas resulting from this mapping usually undergo some further 
simplifications, such as replacing (P = t) <=? (Q = t) by P = Q, and (P = t) ~ 
( Q = f) by P = neg( Q) where the function neg is defined as 
neg: {t,f} ~----+ {t,J}, { 
t : x=f 
neg(x) = f : x = t 
After applying this mapping on the predicate E, a manipulation called generaliz-
ation is possible, which is of more heuristic nature and no more truth-preserving. In 
our case, term P (M) may be generalized to a metavariable N of sort Set satisfying: 
'v' xeM,yeNY( X) E { t, f} (1) 
which in fact defines P(M). Notice that this restriction is added to the set of 
preconditions. As will be illustrated in the next step, a generalization usually adds 
a precondition which is a property weaker than the definition. 
There is apparently still a gap between the precondition of the problem, 
'v'xe(o,1]'v'neNx(n) E {0, 1, 2, · · ·, 9} and the precondition in (1). This can be bridged 
by a generalization of the two constants { 0,1} and { 0, 1, 2, · · · , 9} into a metaYariable 
U of sort Set. 
A new tactic-method pair is achieved based on the mapping:{O, 1} ~----+ U 
Method: Diagonalization- N ~----+ [0, 1] 
• Precondition: 3u:IUI~2 'v' yEN <=? 'v' xeMY( X) E u 
• Post Condition: -.3f:M,_.NSurj(f) 
• Tactic: Applying Schema-Diagonalization-N ~----+ [0, 1](see below) 
1. ~ r Theo; JP 
1.1. 6' = 6 + -.Theo r ..L;? 
1.1.1. ~' r 'v'xeN3yeMf(y) = x;def.Surj 
1.1.2. 6' r 3seN'v'yeMf(y) =IS; 2 *Choices 
1.1.2.1. 6' r 3geu--u'v'xeug(x) =I x,? 
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1.1.2.2. 6" = 6' + g E U ~-----+ U 1\ 'rlxeug(x) =J. x 1- 3s'rlxeMS(x) -
g(f(x )(x)), Comp.Axiom 
1.1.2.3. 6" + 'rlxeMS(x) = g(f(x)(x)) 1- 3seNVyeMf(y) =J. S; 
Instantiation for N ~-----+ [0, 1) example: M ~-----+ N, N ~-----+ [0, 1), U ~-----+ 
{0, 1, · · ·, 9}. The precondition is satisfied, since 'rlxeN'rlye[o,1Jx(y) E {0, 1, · · ·, 9} 
While the introduction of U may be easily ascribed to the existence of heuristic 
knowledge of some sort, the creation of the new function g is a step demanding real 
human creativity. We probably have to appeal to analogical reasoning. A property 
of the original sets is added as a precondition: IUI ~ 2. We want to mention again, 
that we still do not know much about metalevel tactics and methods, still less how 
they are employed by the planner. Much investigation is needed. 
4 A Dynamic Description of Theorem Proving 
Since our emphasis is laid more on the static part of the theory, and since we still do 
not know much about the dynamic behavior, this discussion is tentative and aimed to 
be suggestive. For a more detailed discussion, see [15).The basic assumption is, that 
there is an autonomous procedure responsible for the planning process. The task of 
this procedure is to analyze the problem, and on the ground of the information con-
tained in methods, to recursively break down the problem into subproblems, and call 
tactics sequentially to solve the subproblems. Since most methods are partial, some 
of the thus planned proof steps have to be verified subsequently. The current state 
of such a dynamic development is always reflected in an internal structure which 
is a proof tree. The planning mode and the verification mode may converge, when 
the methods employed are complete. Whenever an existing plan fails, a replanning 
phase usually begins. . 
There are also metalevel activities. In our theory, a procedure or tactic is at 
the metalevel if it causes changes in the knowledge base, rather than the proof tree. 
Metalevel tactics are usually invoked by the intention to solve a specific problem, 
and their application require concentration and effort, as opposed to those more 
perceptual procedures, like the remembrance of a proof or of a rule [15). 
We can account for the acquisition of all the three kinds of declarative knowledge: 
in the first case it is fairly simple. If a particular subproof is carried out repeatedly, 
its input-output specification may be put together into a new acquired rule of in-
ference and remembered. The total amount of inference rules at the disposal of 
a reasoner is referred to as his natural calculus, which contains the natural logic 
as a subset. Second, new axioms and definitions are constantly incorporated into 
the conceptual structure of a reasoner, as well as proved theorems [18]. Third, the 
initial proof schemata are simply proofs of some problems learned by the reasoner, 
by reading mathematical text books, for instance, or by being taught. The problem 
specifications can be taken over as the initial methods. Afterwards, new tactics and 




In this section, we examine our theory from the perspective of the two roles it is 
supposed to play, and sketch an outlook of further development. 
As an explanatory framework, as far as we know, it is the first attempt to set 
up a full-fledged computational model for human formal reasoning, as opposed to 
daily casual reasoning studied by psychologists [6, 16, 19, 22]. For an overview, see 
[17). As such, however, we must point out that much empirical studies still have to 
be made to substantiate the framework in general, on the one hand, and to settle 
the remaining unsolved problems, on the other. Among the most important are the 
planning process itself, and the repertoire of metalevel tactics. And as a natural 
consequence, they provide an excellent basis for explaining proofs found [13]. 
Within the community of automated deduction in AI, there are mainly two 
approaches pursued to build intelligent and efficient inference systems. The first 
paradigm uses a more human oriented framework, involving primarily operations 
understandable by human beings. Researches along this line can be found in 
(5 , 9, 21 , 3, 7]. More recently, Alan Bundy has called on to start a full-scaled 
investigation of what he calls a science of reasoning. This paper can be viewed as an 
initial response to this call. Compared with the way compound inference rules are 
generated to enhance the reasoning ability in interactive deduction systems [10], the 
three precisely defined levels of object level tactics are much better psychologically 
supported and provide a more natural way of organizing our deductive repertoire. 
The second paradigm [23, 2, 4, 11] may be characterized as using the enormous 
computational power of the modern computers to solve problems through relatively 
blind searching. Despite this deep gap, some concepts developed in our framework 
turn out to be useful even for this type of systems, especially the notion of the 
applications of assertions. With its naturalness and abstractness, it provides a an 
adequate level of intermediate representation in the process of transforming machine 
generated proofs into natural language. The length of assertion level p~oofs are 
normally only one third of that of natural deduction proofs at the logic level [14]. 
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Abstract 
We present a new approach to Automated Deduction based on the concept of Shannon 
graphs, which are also known as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). A Skolemized formula is 
first transformed into a Shannon graph, then the latter is compiled into a set of Horn clauses. 
These can finally be run as a Prolog program trying to refute the initial formula. It is also 
possible to precompile axiomatizations into Prolog and load these theories as required. 
Keywords: Automated Deduction, Shannon Graphs, Binary Decision Diagrams 
1 Introduction 
Logical formulae are usually defined using some or all of the connectives 
{ •, V,/\,~, f-.+}. Alternatively, one can use a ternary if-then-else operator "sh", 
which can be viewed as an abbreviation: sh(A, So, St) = ( •AI\So)V(AI\St)· Thus, 
sh(A, S0 , S1) corresponds to an expression of the form "if A then S1 else So". 
Formulae using only this operator are called Shannon graphs (introduced by Shan-
non in [Shannon, 1938]) or Binary Decision Diagrams [Lee, 1959]. BDDs have been 
successfully used for Boolean function manipulation [Bryant, 1986, Brace et al., 
1990], for example in the context of hardware verification [Kropf & Wunderlich, 
1991] or for processing database queries [Kemper et al., 1992]. 
Up to now, this method has hardly influenced research in Automated Deduction, 
probably because it has not yet been extended to full first-order logic1• We will 
show how this can be done and argue that the concept of Shannon graphs is indeed 
a useful framework for implementing a first-order deduction system. 
The underlying idea for the proposed proof procedure is to transform a formula 
into a Shannon graph and compile this graph into Horn clauses. When run as a 
10nly Orlowska [Orlowska, 1969] has described an extension to a decidable subset of first-order logic. 
36 
Prolog program the clauses simulate traversing the Shannon graph. This process 
tries to show properties of the graph which are equivalent to the fact that the 
formula cannot have a model. 
An experimental Prolog-implementation of a propositional prover based on 
these principles proved to be quite efficient (see Section 3.1); so, the extension 
of the principle to first-order logic, which is currently being implemented seems 
prormsmg. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, Shannon graphs and their 
semantics are given together with a transformation from formulae to Shannon 
graphs. Properties relating to the soundness and completeness of our proof method 
are stated. Section 3 describes how one can implement the proof procedure by 
generation of Horn clauses and gives some test results for propositionallogic. 
2 First-order Shannon Graphs 
Let ~ be the language of first-order calculus defined in the usual way; ~At are the 
atomic formulae of~- "sh" is a new ternary connective, which can be regarded as 
an abbreviation: sh(A, So, Sl) = (•AI\So)V(AI\81). 
Definition 1 The set of Shannon graphs is denoted by S'H and defined as the 
smallest set such that 
{1} 0,1 E S1i 
{2} if So, S1 E S1i and A E ~At then sh(A, So, S1) is in S1i. 
The truth-value val'D,.B of a Shannon graph S in a given structure 'D with a fixed 




val'D,.B ( s h_) 
val'D,.B ( s h+) 
ifs= 0 
ifS= 1 
if S = sh(A, sh_, sh+) and val'D,.e(A) =false 
if S = sh(A, sh_, sh+) and val'D,.e(A) =true 
• 
We can visualize the formulae of S'H as binary trees with leaves 0 and 1. Each 
nonterminal node is labeled with the atomic formula occurring in the first argument 
of a "sh" -term. Nodes have a negative and a positive edge leading to subtrees re-
presenting the second or third argument of the corresponding "sh"-term, respecti-
vely. Consider the formula al\b: its Shannon graph S 1 = sh(a, 0, sh(b, 0, 1)) is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Semantically, a Shannon graph can be regarded as a case-analysis over the truth-
values of atoms occurring in a formula. Assume there is a sequence of nodes and 
edges from the root to an arbitrary leaf of a Shannon graph. We prefix each atomic 
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-~+ ®® 
Figure 1: Shannon Graphs for al\b, -.a, and al\bl\-.a 
formula with the sign of the corresponding node's outgoing edge: for example in 
S 1 in Figure 1, [+a, +b] is such a sequence leading to a 1-leaf. We will call such a 
sequence a path. 
If the atoms of some path can be consistently interpreted with the truth-value 
that their prefix suggests (ie true for a positive and false for a negative edge), then 
the path represents an interpretation. Under this interpretation the whole formula 
will have the truth-value with which the leaf is labeled. 
Conversely, if an atomic formula and its complement occur on a path as in 
[+a, +b, -a] in Sa, then the path is called inconsistent or closed and there is no 
need to investigate it any further. 
Let us assume henceforth that a Skolemized formula F(X1, ... ,Xn) (or F(X) 
for short) with the free variables X 1, ..• , X n is given 2. 
In order to prove the unsatisfiability of the universal closure ClvF(X) of F(X), 
we proceed by constructing a logically equivalent Shannon graph :F(X) and try to 
show that it contains no consistent path to a 1-leaf. 
The construction is done in the following way: obviously, an atomic formula A 
is logically equivalent to sh(A, 0, 1). If we already have two Shannon graphs A 
and B representing the formulae A and B, we construct the Shannon graph for 
AI\B by replacing all 1-leaves of A with B. This replacement is denoted A[B]. 
In Figure 1, Sa is the result of replacing the 1-leaf in S 1with S2. Analogously, 
disjunctions are handled by replacing 0-leaves. 
Now the transformation conv : F(X) ~---+ :F(X) which maps a formula to its 
Shannon graph is given by 




sh(F, 0, 1) 




if FE .CAt 
ifF=AAB 
ifF=AVB 
if F= A-+B 
if F =-,A 
• 
One easily verifies that the time and space complexity of the above transformation 
conv as well as the size of the resulting Shannon graph are proportional to the size 
of the input formula if structure sharing is used for the replacement of leaves. le, 
if several leaves are replaced by the same graph, we do not copy this graph but 
introduce edges to a single instance of it. Therefore, conv constructs a directed, 
acyclic graph, and not a tree. 
Remark 1 Note, that there is a cheap way to optimize the generated graph: 
assume we are to construct a graph for AAB; we can either construct 
conv(A)[con!(B)], or the logically equivalent graph conv(B)(con!(A ]. Although both 
graphs do not differ in size, the trees they represent generally ~o. As those trees 
are the potential search space for a proof, it is of course desirable to construct the 
graph that represents the smallest of those trees. Fortunately, this size can easily 
be determined in advance: 
Assume that # 1, #o, and #at denote the number of1-leaves, 0-leaves, and (non-
terminal) nodes of the tree represented by a Shannon graph. If A and B are Shan-
non graphs, then the size of the tree for g = A["hJ will be: 
#at(A) + #o(A) + #1(A) · (#at(B) + #o(B) + #1(B)) 
or, equivalently, 
#o(A) + #1(A) · #o(B) + #at(A) + #1(A) · #at(B) + #1(A) · #1(8) 
The size of the tree in case of a disjunction can be determined analogously. 
Although this heuristic works only locally and does not guarantee to generate the 
best global result, it has proven to be very useful in practice. 
• 
Let us call F(X)a closed if all paths to 1-leaves in :F(X)a are inconsistent, 
where a substitutes the free variables X of F(X). Now a basic property of Shannon 
graphs can be stated: 
Proposition 1 Let F(X) = conv(F(X)). If there is a grounding substitution a 
such that F(X)a is closed then F(X)a is unsatisfiable. • 
How do we find such a a? We trave~~e a Shannon graph building a path. If a 
path contains two unifiable atoms A1 a = A2a with complementary signs then a 
will close that path. 
Consider the following example: 
Let Po(X) := p(a)f\-,p(f(f(a)))/\(p(X)-+p(f(X))). We want to show that 
ClvPo(X) is unsatisfiable. The equivalent Shannon graph Po(X) = conv(Po(X)) 
is shown on the left in Figure 2: 
Po(X) 
Search Tree for P1(X,Y) :""o': :"1·: 
· ... 
Figure 2: Proving inconsistency of ClvP0(X) := p(a)A...,p(J(J(a)))A'v'X(p(X)-+p(J(X))) 
The path [+p(a), -p(f(f(a))), -p(X)] to the leftmost 1-leaf in Po(X) can be 
closed with the substitution a= [X fa]. Unfortunately there is no substitution such 
that both paths to 1-leaves become inconsistent, so we cannot prove the unsatis-
fiability of ClvPo(X) with Po(X). To do this we need to consider a consequence 
of the compactness of first-order logic: 
Proposition 2 ClvF(X) is unsatisfiable if! ::lk E IN, ::la : (F(Xo)/\ ... 1\F(Xk))a 
is unsatisfiable. 
a maps variables to ground terms, ie to terms from the H erbrand-universe Up 
ofF and each Xi is a new variable vector Xi,l, ... , Xi,n distinct from all Xi with 
j < i. 
• 
Since there is no a such that P 0(X)a can be closed (cf. Figure 2), we extend 
P 0(X) by replacing its 1-leaves with an instance of P 0 with renamed variables. 
The result P1(X, Y) := Po(X)[po~Y)] is by Definitions 1 and 2logically equivalent 
to P1(X, Y) := P0(X)/\Po(Y). Now the substitution a = [X fa, Y/ f(a)] yields 
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a closed Shannon graph P1(X, Y)u. Hence P1(X, Y)u is unsatisfiable and by 
Proposition 2 so is ClvPo(X). 
Note that the dotted subtree rooted at the negative edge of p(X) can be pruned 
from the search space: all paths going through this edge are closed with the 
substitution [X/a]. Additionally, all edges to 0-leaves are actually never considered 
during the proof search. 
For the general case, consider the sequence of Shannon graphs 
Fo(Xo) conv(F(Xo)) 
- - - - 1 Fi+I(Xo, ... , Xi+I) = Fi(Xo, ... , Xi)[Fo(Xi+l)] 
Starting from the initial Shannon graph F 0(X0 ) of a Skolemized formula F(Xo) we 
construct an extension Fi+l of Fi by replacing its 1-leaves with an instance of the 
initial graph with new variables. This corresponds to constructing the conjunction 
of Proposition 2. 
From the Definitions 1 and 2 it follows that valn . .B(Fk(Xo, ... , Xk)) = 
va/.n . .B(F(Xo)/\ ... 1\F(Xk)), so if ClvF(Xo) is unsatisfiable (cf. Proposition 2) we 
will eventually arrive at a F k which can be closed for some u. 
3 Generating Horn clauses 
To show the unsatisfiability of a formula ClvF(X), we have to traverse its Shannon 
graph Fo(X) trying to find a substitution that closes all paths from the root to 
1-leaves; if there is no such substitution, we extend Fo(X). For implementing the 
above method, we propose to compile Fo(X) into a set of Horn clauses, which 
simulate the Shannon graph traversal. 
Remember that Fo(X) has a representation which is proportional to the size of 
the input formula. We proceed as follows: 
For leaves no clauses are generated; for every nonterminal node in F 0 we gene-
rate exactly one Prolog-clause, which must accomplish one or more of the following 
tasks : 
• find a substitution that closes the current path 
• extend a 1-leaf 
• transfer control to the clauses for child nodes 
Therefore we supply the clause with the current variable binding, the path con-
structed so far, and a designator of the current extension (level). A clause succeeds 
if at each 1-leaf reachable from the corresponding node the path can be made in-
consistent. To get a more definite idea, we will briefly discuss a simplified clause 
for the node p(X) of Po, cf. Figure 2: 
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node_3 (Binding, Path, Level) :- (1) 
nth (Level, Binding, [X] ) , (2) 
(close ( [ -p (X) I Path] ) (3) 
; (NLevel is Level+1,node_1(Binding, [-p(X) IPath] ,NLevel))), (4) 
node_4(Binding, [ +p(X) I Path] , Level). (5) 
In line (2), all free variables occurring in the atomic formula with which the 
current node is labeled, are bound (in this case only X). Technically, this can be 
done in the following way: since each level has its own set of variables, the variable 
bindings are level-dependent. It is assumed that Binding is a list of such variable 
bindings where the n-th element stores the binding for the n-th level. Each binding 
itself is also a list, which holds the value of each variable at a certain position; 
during compile time, a list is constructed that matches these position( s) in order 
to extract the required bindings. As our example contains only one variable, the 
matching list is just [X]. 
The predicate close in line (3) tries to make Path together with -p(X) in-
consistent as we reach a 1-leaf at the negative edge; if this fails, line ( 4) extends 
the graph by increasing the level counter and calling the clause for the root-node 
again. So extending the graph is modeled without asserting new Prolog clauses. 
This is correct since each level establishes its own variable bindings. 
Calling the clause for the root-node again will succeed if all paths to 1-leaves 
in one of the next extensions can be made inconsistent. 
Finally, we have to show that all paths to 1-leaves reachable from the positive 
edge of p(X) are also inconsistent therefore we call the child node_4 at the positive 
edge. 
Our proposed proof procedure will be complete if we use bounded depth-first 
search with iterative deepening and force the predicate close to enumerate all 
possible solutions (ie ways to close paths) on backtracking. Another, more efficient 
approach is to implement a fair selection scheme for close. 
It should be noted that the example clauses are not a particular efficient way 
to code the problem in Prolog; clearness and readability has been preferred over 
efficiency. 
3.1 Propositional Logic 
The method described above has been implemented for propositionallogic; a first-
order version is currently under development. In the propositional case, the struc-
ture of the generated Prolog clauses can be kept much simpler, since no extensions 
take place and no variable bindings need to be considered. The maximal length 
of the generated paths is also known in advance, so much more efficient data-
structures can be used for representing paths. Performance figures for pigeon hole 
formulae with a propositional version of the prover are shown in Table 1: 
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Search Space CPU Time [msec] 
Problem Graph Nodes Potential Explored Closed Paths Preproc Compile Proof 
pig2 4 9 3 2 17 83 < 17 
pig3 18 2,045 60 37 100 300 < 17 
pig4 48 6.4. 107 882 644 233 683 < 17 
pig5 100 3.0. 1015 9,677 7,351 466 1,417 83 
pig6 180 1.5. 1027 156,756 124,265 816 2,533 1,717 
pig7 294 5.7. 1043 2,961,695 2,414,873 1,383 4,050 28,733 
The CPU times are measured on a Sun-4 with Quintus Prolog 3.0.; it was not possible to measure 
times less than 17 msec. 
Table 1: Some Test Results. 
"pig n" stands for "n pigeons do not fit into n - 1 holes"; "Graph Nodes" 
shows the size of the initial graph. The columns labeled "Search Space" give the 
potential search space, ie, the size of the tree represented by the initial graph, 
and the number of nodes that have actually been visited. "Closed Paths" is the 
number of paths that have been constructed and closed, which corresponds to the 
number of partial models that have been generated and ruled out. 
"Preproc" is the time for computing the initial graph and generating the Prolog 
clauses; "Compile" gives the time required by the Prolog System to compile the 
latter. "Proof" is the time used for executing the generated Prolog clauses, ie, the 
search for a model. 
4 Conclusions 
We have described a method to compile first-order formulae via Shannon graphs 
into Horn clauses. The method differs from other approaches to deduction by 
Horn clause generation (e.g. [Stickel, 1988]), in that the generated clauses have no 
logical relation to the formula that is to be proven (ie are not a logically equivalent 
variant of the formula), but that they are procedurally equivalent to the search for 
a model. This is reflected by the fact that Prolog's SLD-resolution can be used 
and no meta-level inference is required. 
It is straightforward to compile Shannon graphs into other target languages. 
This has already been done for C and i386-Assembler in the case of propositional 
logic. The performance of the version generating C code is roughly comparable 
to the Prolog version. This is basically due to the fact that the generated Prolog 
clauses have a very simple structure and can be efficiently handled by Prolog. For 
a first-order version, however, C can be expected to perform better, since some 
optimizations are hard to encode in Prolog. 
The version of the prover compiling to Assembler is clearly the fastest one, 
yielding results about 20-30 times better than those presented in Table 1 for 
Prolog. If an application requires very short run-times, it would even be possible 
to by-pass the use of an Assembler and generate machine language, directly. 
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Note that the compilation process can also be done in advance for a set of 
axioms. Such precompiled theories can then be loaded into a deduction system 
and used for inference. In this context it is also reasonable to reduce a Shannon 
graph before compiling it into Prolog. Reduction is a well-known operation on 
Shannon graphs, which often decreases its size considerably. Though reduction 
may add to the cost of preprocessing, the resulting search space at run-time will 
be smaller. 
References 
[Brace et al., 1990] Karl S. Brace, Richard L. Rudell, & Randal E. Bryant. Ef-
ficient implementation of a BDD package. In Proc. 21h AGM/IEEE Design 
Automation Conference, pages 40- 45. IEEE Press, 1990. 
[Bryant, 1986] Randal Y. Bryant. Graph-based algorithms for Boolean function 
manipulation. IEEE Transactions on Computers, C-35:677- 691, 1986. 
[Kemper et al., 1992] A. Kemper, G. Moerkotte, & M. Steinbrunn. Optimization 
of boolean expressions in object bases. In Proc. Intern. Conf. on Very Large 
Databases, 1992. 
[Kropf & Wunderlich, 1991] T. Kropf & H.-J. Wunderlich. A common approach 
to test generation and hardware verification based on temporal logic. In Proc. 
Intern. Test Conf., pages 57-66, Nashville, TN, October 1991. 
.[Lee, 1959] C. Lee. Representation of switching circuits by binary decision dia-
grams. Bell System Technical Journal, 38:985-999, 1959. 
(Orlowska, 1969] Ewa Orlowska. Automatic theorem proving in a certain class of 
formulae of predicate calculus. Bull. de L'Acad. Pol. des Sci., Serie des sci. 
math., astr. et phys., XVII(3):117- 119, 1969. 
[Posegga, 1992] Joachim Posegga. First-order shannon graphs. In Proc. Works-
hop on Automated Deduction / Intern. Conf. on Fifth Generation Computer 
Systems, ICOT TM-1184, Tokyo, Japan, June 1992. 
[Shannon, 1938] C. E. Shannon. A symbolic analysis of relay and switching cir-
cuits. AIEE Transactions, 67:713- 723, 1938. 
[Stickel, 1988] Mark E. Stickel. A Prolog Technology Theorem Prover. In E. Lusk 
& R. Overbeek, editors, 9th International Conference on Automated Deduction, 
Argonne, Ill., May 1988. Springer-Verlag. 
44 
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Abstract 
The euphoric period in the history of expert systems has definitely come 
to an end. lt is presently time to review the efforts which have been made 
in this field. Oriented to our conceptual framework of knowledge trans-
formation, some trip wires which can seriously jeopardize the success of 
expert-system-developing projects are described in the following. 
1 Introduction 
Our research interests focus on the following questions: (a) Which are 
the application fields where expert system technology can be regarded as 
successful and where does it fail? (b) What are the dimensions we have to 
refer to in order to explain success and failure of expert-system-developing 
projects? 
Of course we are not the first to ask these questions (Mertens 1987; 
Coy, Bonsiepen 1989; Daniel, Striebel, Clemens-Schwartz 1989; Lutz, 
Moldaschl 1989; Hillenkamp 1989; Bullinger, Kornwachs 1990; Christaller 
1991 ). But there are four reasons why we find expert system technology 
1This contribution is a sketch of intermediate results of a CUTent empirical research project which is fln31'lCed 
by the German Ministry for Research and Tecmology and conducted by the University of Dortrn.J'ld/Dept. 
Tecmology and Society. DU' findings are predominantly based on first-hand information we have gathered in 56 
interviews on 22 expert systems. 
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worth to be reexamined thoroughly. (a) The unrealistic euphoria of the 
1980s has vanished. (b) There is still a lack of explanation of the dis-
couragingly high rate of failed systems. (c) The greatest part of research in 
this field focuses on merely technical or economic issues and does not 
reflect social and organizational preconditions. (d) And if the studies do 
explicitly deal with these contexts (Hillenkamp 1989; Lutz, Moldaschl 1989) 
they do not go beyond the application side and only reflect the social 
impacts of technology without examining development processes. In our 
view it is necessary to avoid limitations of this kind. 
The application fields we have investigated are all industrial ones and are 
listed as follows: 
- Customer-specific product configuration 
- Machinery fault-diagnosis 
- Synthesis and analysis in the chemical laboratory 
- Engineering of production processes 
- Determination of manufacture planning 
We have concentrated on these fields because they are considered to 
be major industrial application areas in Germany as well as worldwide 
(Mertens, Borkowski, Geis 1990). 15 of the 22 expert systems we studied in 
total were apt for detailed analysis. Although we have focused on systems 
described as "running systems" in German expert system literatureit became 
obvious that many of these systems were anything but successful 
Table 1: The distribution of success and 
failure over the application fields 
SUCCESS- FAILED IN DEVELOP- TOTALS 
AREAS FUL MENT 
CONFIGURATION 4 - - 4 
MACHINERY I 
- I 5 - 5 FAULT-DIAGNOSIS 






I 1 1 - 2 I ENGINEERING I I 






i TOTALS I 6 8 1 15 
46 
running systems. As the following table shows, 8 expert systems failed 
either in the stage of development or later in practice. Only 6 systems can 
be considered successful in that they were technically functionable. (Only 4 
of them, in our view, have definitely proved to be successful also in the 
commercial sense). 
This table shows a second remarkable finding: Success and failure are 
distributed unevenly over the studied fields. In the configuration area, all 
systems which we have examined were successful whereas in the area of 
diagnosis (which is according to common opinion a "classic" area of appli-
cation for knowledge-based systems) no system in our sample of 5 was 
successfully implemented. In chemical laboratory and process control we 
evaluated one successful and one failed system in each area. The 
manufacture planning system we studied was at the testing stage of appli-
cation. At present we do not know of its effectiveness. 
As we do not only want to classify systems in regard to their success, 
we shall give some explanations for the distribution of success and failure 
within as well as across the application fields. In other words we want to 
identify trip wires on the way to success. For this purpose we will adopt the 
theoretical concept of knowledge transformation (Malsch 1987), which 
serves us as a conceptual framework for the reconstruction of the process 
of the development and application of expert systems. The process of 
knowledge transformation can be segmented in three stages: {1) knowledge 
acquisition, (2) the "objectivation" of knowledge in the form of a technical 
artefact and (3) the reintegration of the knowledge represented in the expert 
systems into the context of application. Each of these stages contains spe-
cific risks of failure. In the following we will refer to the crucial points in the 
process of knowledge transformation, seemingly appropriate for revealing 
some important aspects in the question of success and failure of expert 
system projects. 
2 The process of knowledge transformation 
(1) The phase of knowledge acquisition involves the risk of losing or 
distorting knowledge. We have located several neuralgic points on the level 
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